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Quality Safeguards and 
Regulation of Online Pharmacies 
Abstract 
Using econometric evidence, this article confirms that distribution of medicines online is split 
into two market segments of very diverse quality, and identifies the factors that drive quality 
and quality assurance in this activity. Unlike fraudulent, ‘rogue,’ websites, which offer scant 
guarantees and usually sell just a few medicines without prescription, online pharmacies 
offering insurance coverage and linked to conventional pharmacies typically sell a whole 
range of drugs, require third-party medical prescriptions and provide abundant information to 
patients. It is shown that, where online pharmacies are allowed to act legally, market forces 
enhance quality, as private insurers require professional standards, and specialized  third 
parties make a business of certifying them. Furthermore, older online pharmacies and those 
running conventional operations offer higher quality, probably because of reputational 
investments. Overall, this evidence supports licensing online pharmacies, especially 
considering that prohibiting them is ineffective against fraudulent sites.  
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1. Distribution of medicines via the Internet 
Online pharmacies challenge existing market structure for the retail sale of medicines. 
Policy-makers find it difficult to deal with such a new form of distribution, because, despite 
its benefits, its functioning is poorly understood, it poses new risks and it may conflict with 
vested interests. This article clarifies some of these issues by showing how and why existing 
online pharmacies offer different levels of quality and suggesting how the regulation could be 
adapted to deal with them more effectively.  
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. The remainder of this section describes how 
online pharmacies work, paying particular attention to their regulation, the diverse quality of 
their services and the risks they involve. Section 2 devises an analytical framework to explain 
which factors determine the level of quality and establishes several hypotheses. According to 
these, service quality and information provision are positively related to licensing and 
insurance coverage and to the reputation of the website operator. These hypotheses are 
confirmed by a series of empirical tests in section 3, run on a purposely-built sample of online 
pharmacies. Section 4 concludes with some policy recommendations and suggestions for 
further research. In particular, results support lifting the prohibitions on online pharmacies 
and using public regulators, health insurers and third-party certifiers to drive this activity to 
the desired level of quality. This might even, indirectly, curb the current underground trade by 
fraudulent online operators, known as ‘rogue sites.’  
1.1. Different regulations and weak enforcement 
In the USA, online pharmacies have been allowed to operate on essentially the same basis 
as ordinary ‘brick and mortar’ pharmacies (Goetz and Lund, 2000). This freedom, together 
with greater development of the Internet and more fragmented and market-driven health care 
and insurance, has allowed online distribution of medicines to become relatively more 
developed there.    3
In contrast, only three European countries (Denmark, Netherlands and the UK) allow 
distance selling of medicines. According to the e-commerce directive,2  the pioneer online 
pharmacies established in these countries are supposedly allowed to sell to buyers from other 
countries of the EU. However, national authorities are increasingly constraining such practice. 
A prominent example can be seen in the Doc.Morris case in Germany, still under litigation.3 
Paradoxically, the European Union strives to facilitate e-commerce by all means (European 
Commission, 1999, 2001) except, in the case of e-pharmacy, for lifting the regulatory 
constraints that make it impossible in most of its member countries.   
Given the difficulties for effective enforcement, prohibition of online pharmacies has not 
stopped illegal trading, however. Enforcement is seriously hindered in e-commerce because it 
breaks the territorial correspondence between enforcers and the regulated. Providers are 
difficult to control when their presence in the territory is confined to the computer screen of 
users. The end result is that prohibition hinders the existence of reliable online operations and 
not only protects conventional pharmacies but may also indirectly benefit rogue sites, as an 
increasing number of customers use them to buy legal medicines that could be provided by 
reliable online sellers, if only they were allowed to operate. 
1.2. Different standards of practice  
Two factors, therefore, determine the odd structure of this market with respect to quality 
of service. Firstly, some countries have allowed licensed online pharmacies to be created. 
                                                 
2 See Bordoni (2001, 2). Three EU directives are involved in defining the regulatory 
environment of European online pharmacies. In principle, Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic 
commerce enables providers to serve consumers in all EU member States, and Directive 
97/7/EC on distance selling makes it possible to deliver prescription medicines by mail. 
However, they may be superseded by national laws which, with the excuse of protecting 
public health and consumers, may in fact be protecting local and conventional providers. The 
stringent regime set by Directive 95/46/EC on data protection might also unnecessarily 
constrain the efficient use of consumers’ databases, an important comparative advantage of 
online pharmacies (Twibell, 2000a). A more general analysis of the comparative prospects 
faced by online pharmacies in the US and the EU is given in Twibell (2000b, 158-95). 
3 See Weber (2000) and Zwick (2001) on this case, and Twibell (2000a) for a description of 
the business strategies of three other pioneer European online pharmacies: the British 
Pharmacy2U, Allcures.com and the Swiss Pharmaworld.com.    4
Secondly, enforcement of prohibitions to sell medicines online from unlicensed sites is weak 
in all countries, due to the novelty and difficulties of controlling e-commerce.  
The simultaneous presence of licensing and ineffective enforcement leads online 
distribution of medicines to split into two market segments, with very diverse levels of 
quality: one segment of high-quality online pharmacies and another of rogue sites. Their 
standard processes can be described by reference to their extreme types.  
High-quality online pharmacies are licensed and comply with regulations like any other 
pharmacy, from which they differ only because they serve their customers online. Typically, 
each user first opens an account, so must send in the details of his credit card and medical 
insurance. After registration, each patient is assigned to a specific team of pharmacists; then, 
either the patient or his doctor sends in a valid prescription by conventional mail, fax or, 
increasingly, by certified e-mail. The pharmacy then sends the medicines by mail from a 
central warehouse or from a conventional pharmacy close to the patient’s home from which 
the patient may also collect them personally. Medicines usually take two or three days to 
arrive for which the patient does not incur additional mail costs, or can be delivered in 24 
hours at a special cost for urgent delivery. Most of these pharmacies also have permanent 
channels of communication so that customers can consult their pharmacists either by a free 
phone service or by e-mail (Henkel, 2000; Heinrich, 2000).  
Low-quality sites, on the contrary, substitute independent medical prescriptions by online 
questionnaires of doubtful effectiveness. Some operators even advertise the fact that no 
prescription is required. (“No prescription? No doctor? No problem”). Those that use 
questionnaires ask patients for basic personal details, such as their age and whether they are 
following any treatment or have any allergies, or whether they have a family or personal 
background of certain illnesses, such as heart disease and cancer. They then provide a text in 
which they explain that, in order to make the purchase, the customer must be over 18, they 
recommend patients to consult their doctors about the use of the drugs and, finally, they ask 
the patients to accept liability for the consequences of the purchase and use of the medicines. 
Most of these sites state that the questionnaires are checked by a doctor who decides on 
whether or not the medicine is appropriate and whether the order should go through or not.   5
1.3. Advantages  
The purchase of medicines via the Internet, as with other types of electronic commerce, 
can be very beneficial for consumers in terms of service and, less clearly, prices.  
Online pharmacies provide added convenience and new services. Users enjoy greater 
availability in terms of opening hours, are able to substitute user travel by mail and can carry 
out comparative shopping, with a wider variety of products and enhanced access to product 
information and privacy (Henkel, 2000; Zbar, 2000). Online pharmacies offer completely new 
services such as sending electronic messages to remind patients to take their medicines at the 
right times or in the correct dose.4 They also maintain exhaustive records on their patients, 
with details of the medicines they consume, their complaints and any contraindications, and 
this allows them to provide a better-quality service and to collaborate efficiently in tests on 
new drugs and in clinical trials. Benefits also extend to other parties, who may attain 
substantial savings in administrative costs (Scanlon, 2001). A report to the European 
Commission thus considered them cost-effective (Gambardella, Orsenigo and Pammolli, 
2000, 61). Certainly, the advantages of Internet distribution vary according to the type of 
product on offer. Being small, lightweight and valuable, most drugs are ideal for all types of 
distance selling, especially electronic commerce. But e-commerce is most useful for users 
when their complaints are easy to identify and when talking about them to the doctor or 
requesting them personally in the pharmacy may be a source of embarrassment. On the other 
hand, drugs which are well-known by patients and which are not covered by health insurance 
are easy to buy on-line. Obviously, sales in online pharmacies are mostly for non-urgent 
drugs,5 especially when patients can estimate demand in advance as with chronic illnesses. 
                                                 
4 For example, the services offered by the CVS-Merck-Medco on-line pharmacy included the 
following in September 2000: “Coverage and pricing comparisons for brand-name and 
generic medications for both mail service and retail; point-and-click refills and renewals; 12 
months of mail service and retail prescription history with or without drug name display—
you choose!; manage your household’s account; personalized health topics and tools—based 
on your expressed interests; time-saving nonprescription shopping lists” (http://www.merck-
medco.com/medco/index.jsp). 
5 CVS, an US leader in both conventional and online pharmaceutical retailing, estimates that 
half its prescription sales contain some element of urgency and will never be sold online 
(“Batalla de precios en Internet,” Diario Médico, January 13, 2000).   6
Such factors explain the success of on-line sales of Viagra and ‘lifestyle drugs’ which assist in 
problems of obesity, balding and the like.  
A recent survey of scientific studies concludes that online markets are more efficient with 
respect to price levels, price updating and price elasticity. They suffer greater price dispersion, 
however, possibly explained by heterogeneity in levels of trust and buyers’ knowledge, and 
are still in a developing stage (Smith, Bailey and Brynjolfsson, 2000). Similar results have 
been observed for online pharmacies, which seem to offer lower prices than their 
conventional counterparts. Trade journals report discounts of between 10 to 30 per cent over 
prices in the real pharmacies belonging to the same companies. Moreover, many pharmacies 
provide additional means of comparing prices, offering very substantial savings for 
consumers.6 Such figures refer to direct discounts for users. In the case of customers covered 
by health insurance schemes, the discount takes the form of a lower co-payment. In addition, 
the insurer usually receives an additional, larger discount. Although, in principle, the user 
does not benefit from such discounts to insurers, in the long term the latter take them into 
account when setting the premiums of their policies so that users purchasing their medicines 
on-line should end up paying less for their policies.  
1.4. The presence and extent of risk 
From a public interest viewpoint, the sale of medicines via the Internet represents a threat 
in that it easily escapes the conventional system of regulation, with dual control by both 
doctor and pharmacist, whatever its real merits. In fact, in many online sales, either the 
doctor’s prescription or the involvement of a pharmacist, or both, are eliminated. This 
happens when the patient purchases the medicines directly, without a prior consultation, with 
no clinical action by the online seller or with any action being based on personal 
questionnaires that are difficult to verify and are of limited efficacy. Thus the doctor cannot 
identify contraindications, the patient receives no information and the pharmacist cannot 
detect harmful interactions or educate patients (Armstrong, Schwartz and Asch, 1999).  
                                                 
6 Of up to 799 per cent as with ranitidin: 60 tablets of Zantac cost 98.70 dollars in October 
2000 in Drugstore.com, a certified pharmacy, whereas it sold the same amount of generic 
ranitidin for 10.98 dollars (accessed October 15, 2000).    7
The existence of doubtful suppliers has been pointed out in many empirical studies. In one 
carried out in 1999 on 77 online suppliers of unprescribed Viagra, the price was seen to vary 
between 5 and 50 dollars, the average price being 12.60 dollars. Some suppliers charged an 
average of 64 dollars for carrying out a health questionnaire. 40 per cent, most of them 
outside the United States, did not request any medical information from the purchaser and 
those that did requested it in a way that was difficult to understand (Armstrong, Schwartz and 
Asch, 1999). Of the 22 pharmacies identified in a more specific study that aimed to estimate 
to what extent Viagra was being sold via the Internet for patients with contra-indications 
(Eysenbach, 1999), 2 required a written prescription from a doctor, 9 dispensed Viagra 
without a prescription at all and 11 issued an ‘online prescription’ after a so-called ‘doctor’ 
had examined a clinical questionnaire. The simulated purchaser was a woman aged 69, with 
difficulty in experiencing orgasm, obesity, coronary insufficiency and high blood pressure and 
who was taking captopril, pravachol, athenolol and erythromycin. She requested 66 pills from 
10 of the 11 pharmacies requiring a questionnaire, 8 of which were based in the United States. 
Three of these companies sold the pills, in spite of the serious contraindications, and seven 
rejected the order.  
The operation of these rogue sites, seemingly selling drugs of dubious quality without 
effective control, has subjected the sector to heavy criticism. Experienced regulators of online 
pharmacies have a more nuanced view, however. First, it is clear that the main problems of e-
commerce medicine sales come from the poor-quality service provided by fraudulent online 
operators, who use the new sales channel to carry out illegal transactions, selling unapproved, 
contaminated, false or expired drugs (Henkel, 2000). Furthermore, not only are such practices 
far from being general, but their health effects are unclear. Even the FDA accepts that there 
are very few known cases of real damage being caused by the sale of medicines on line 
(Henkel, 2000). It seems that such rogue sites do not sell narcotics, stimulants, depressants 
and anabolic steroids that are controlled substances regulated in the US by the Drug 
Enforcement Administration.7 To make things even more ambiguous, allowing users to get 
round regulatory obstacles is not always inefficient. This may well be the case when 
regulators get into the habit of delaying authorization of new medicines as a silent way of 
saving pharmacy costs.  
                                                 
7 “Prescription for Trouble” (Consumer Reports, February 2001, 66[2], 19-22).   8
What seems clear, in any case, is that the risks associated with rogue sites are not present 
when dealing with high-quality online pharmacies. These may even provide better quality and 
control than conventional European pharmacies. First, because online pharmacies enjoy more 
powerful incentives to comply due to their larger scale, the role of reputation (when compared 
to the typical European pharmacy owned by an individual) may take on greater importance, 
and policing their behaviour is easier. Second, their technology also allows them to provide a 
service of high quality. The main alleged defect of online pharmacies in this respect is the 
lack of direct contact between patient and pharmacist. Personal contact certainly diminishes, 
but this does not necessarily imply a reduction in clinical activity. Personal consultation is 
always restricted for reasons of cost whereas the online pharmacy reduces the cost of 
communication and therefore increases its intensity. For example, it may be less costly for 
many patients to ask for advice by e-mail than in person and it may be more convenient for 
the pharmacist to use the same method because it enables him or her to schedule his time 
better. This, together with a wider use of computer databases, may increase the amount and 
quality of professional advice instead of reducing it.  
2. Analytical framework 
2.1. Quality assurance and testable hypotheses 
The economics of quality assurance is based on distinguishing a set of specific problems 
and safeguards. Problems are  defined in terms of the type of information asymmetry extant 
between the parties and their unique or repetitive interaction (Tirole, 1988, 106-26). 
Safeguards are mainly based on the threat of losing quasi-rents linked to previous investments 
in real or reputational assets (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983). 
Most medicines present a mix of ‘experience’ attributes (Nelson, 1970), whose quality is 
only known after consumption (pain relief, delivery time), and ‘credence’ attributes (Darby 
and Karni, 1973), for which quality is never known (hidden effects). This, together with the 
need of expertise for the evaluation of attributes, generates substantial scope for information   9
asymmetry. This asymmetry is the main reason behind normative arguments for licensing and 
other conventional regulation. Licensing not only controls quality directly but it also defers 
compensation, by creating a stream of quasi-rents that helps prevent the provision of low-
quality services to uninformed users.  
In the case of online pharmacies, identical mechanisms are in place for pharmacies which 
are licensed by a public agency or whose sales are covered by insurers. Both of these 
decisions, licensing and providing insurance coverage, are made by third parties with an 
interest in avoiding low quality. Both also create quasi-rents to the extent that losing a license 
or the coverage of insurers would cause substantial losses.  
In addition, two other drivers of quality may be present as a consequence of pure market 
forces. First, some online pharmacies put great amounts of reputational capital in play, the 
value of which would be destroyed if they were caught cheating. This is clearer for those 
which also run conventional operations and cover their online operations under the same 
reputational ‘umbrella.’ Second, older online pharmacies can be expected to provide greater 
quality because of reputational and learning effects. On the one hand, given the presence of 
experience attributes in the purchase of medicines, reputation will tend to accumulate with 
each instance that an online pharmacy delivers on its promises so, the longer a pharmacy is in 
business, the better known and more valuable its trade name will be.8 On the other hand, 
substantial learning economies can be expected in a new activity like this, and these 
economies will also be greater in older operators.  
In summary, the following four hypotheses will be tested in this article:  
1.   Pharmacy type: 
Two types of online pharmacies deliver widely different quality.  
2.   Insurance coverage:  
Quality is higher for pharmacies with insurance coverage.  
3.   Reputation extension:  
Online quality is positively related to reputational capital.  
4.   Age effect:  
Quality is positively related to the age of the pharmacy.   
                                                 
8 See Lafontaine (1992), Thompson (1994) and Arruñada, Garicano and Vázquez (2001) for a 
similar interpretation of age as a proxy of reputation in the service sector.    10
2.2. Data and methodology 
A specific sample was built to test these hypotheses. It was drawn up by compiling the 
most outstanding characteristics of all online pharmacies listed by the Yahoo search engine.9 
The information was obtained by direct visits and examination of their web sites during the 
months of February and March 2001. Visits were repeated for consistency in June 2002 and 
changes observed were not statistically significant. 
Business practices of online pharmacies were measured based on 17 attributes, each 
represented by a dependent variable, and three additional indices built from them. Table 1 
defines the variables considered and summarizes the descriptive statistics. Attributes 
considered are of three kinds: service quality, information and third-party certification.  
First, the quality of services provided takes into account the following: if the pharmacy 
requires an independent prescription (PrescRqd), without relying fully on an internal 
questionnaire or not requiring any prescription at all;10 if it is willing or not to sell in foreign 
markets products requiring a prescription (FrgnSales); if it sells or not other products in 
addition to medicines (OtherPrd); the number of different products it sells (Products); and if 
it sells or not generic drugs (Generics). In addition, the cost of express delivery service 
(UrgntFee) is also considered. All these variables (with the exception of the urgency fee, 
because of the lower number of observations available) were used to build a global index of 
service quality (QualIndex) using principal components analysis, as reported in Table 2.  
Second, the information supplied to users is proxied through five dummy variables. Three 
of them represent the different kinds of information channels, consisting of a phone line or e-
mail address to deal with problems related to purchases and deliveries (PhoneLine and E-mail 
variables respectively), or a service that allows buyers to consult about the use of medicines 
                                                 
9 In http://dir.yahoo.com/Business_and_Economy/Shopping_and_Services/Health/ Pharmacies/. 
Six further pharmacies found using Altavista were added. No others were found using other 
search engines. All the pharmacies that sold more than one product were taken into account. 
For those offering a single product, a sample of 39 observations was taken, giving a sample 
error of one per cent. Internet sites that only offered information or sold over-the-counter 
products were excluded. 
10 Giving three values to this variable for distinguishing these two possibilities did not make 
any significant difference.    11
(AskPharm), plus the total number of information channels available (InfoIndex). Two other 
dummies consider the provision of pricing information, either through lists of prices 
(PriceLis) and/or price comparisons with competitive pharmacies (PriceCom). An index of 
information quality (InfoIndex) has also been built using principal components analysis 
(weights are given in Table 3). 
Third, external certification of quality is measured considering the availability of each 
different accreditation via specific dummies (VIPPS, HON and VeriSign) that take value one 
when the pharmacy holds the corresponding certification, zero otherwise. The total number of 
certifications held by each site (Certifcs) is also measured, adding five other certificates that 
are less common to these three.11  
The first hypothesis—on pharmacy type—will be tested using the variables in the 
previous sets of attributes, while the three quality factors that define hypotheses two to four 
will be proxied as follows. In the second hypothesis, licensing and insurance will be measured 
by third-party insurance coverage, InsurCov, a dummy that takes the value of one if insurers 
cover purchases of medicines in this pharmacy, and zero otherwise. This assumes that third-
party insurers would not be willing to pay for purchases in unlicensed pharmacies. This is 
somehow stricter than mere licensing, but gets rid of potential difficulties caused by the use of 
variable standards of rigor in licensing decisions, mainly where these decisions are made by 
regional or state authorities. The assumption is also supported by the evolution of online 
pharmacies in the US, in whose success insurers played an essential role (Woldt, 1999; 
Scanlon, 2001). In the third hypothesis, which tests whether service quality increases with 
reputation, reputation will be proxied by RealAssets, another binary variable that takes value 
one when the firm also runs a conventional pharmacy operation, and zero if it operates only 
through the Internet. This variable, therefore, captures reputational spillovers from or to ‘brick 
and mortar’ activities.12 In addition, the existence of such spillovers will also be examined by 
                                                 
11 See the following sites for information: http://www.nabp.net/vipps/intro.asp, 
http://www.hon.ch/HONcode/Conduct.html and http://www.verisign.com (visited September 
4, 2001). To obtain a VIPPS certification, which is the most important, an online pharmacy 
must meet 17 criteria about patient confidentiality, prescription security, quality assurance, 
and patient-pharmacist consultation (Fisher, 2000).  
12 Lack of data on alternative reputational investments, such as advertising in launching the 
online operation, is not likely to be a major problem in this case, given the relative values of 
the assets involved.    12
checking the prediction that pure online pharmacies rely more on third-party certification. 
Finally, the joint effect of accumulated reputational investments and learning economies, 
posited in the fourth hypothesis, will be measured by the time the seller has been operating 
online, measured in years (PharmAge).    
The empirical analysis will be based on several methods. Firstly, a cluster analysis will be 
used to identify well-separated groups in the sample. These groups will then be tested by 
comparing their means in order to confirm the typological hypothesis. Secondly, quality 
attributes of online pharmacies will be regressed on three independent variables (InsurCov, 
RealAssets and PharmAge) which are provisionally considered as exogenous, paying special 
attention to the existence of one-way causations by dummy variables (structural zeroes). 
Thirdly, a system of structural equations will be estimated to check that the results are not 
substantially affected by potential endogeneity of any of the independent variables.  
3. Results 
3.1. The diversity of online pharmacies 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 already show the diversity of business 
practices followed in the sale of medicines through the Internet. Insurers cover purchases in 
19.47% of all the online pharmacies in the sample. A minority (13.27%) also run 
conventional operations. On average, they had been open for slightly more than one year 
(13.7 months), with a maximum of seven years. A doctor’s prescription is required by 30.09% 
of them. Only a few (14.16%) sell other products in addition to drugs but most of them 
(70.19%) are happy to sell in foreign markets. Around a third (31.86%) carry a full range of   13
drugs,13 in contrast to another third (33,63%) who carry only one product, with the remaining 
sites carrying between 2 and 29 drugs with an average of 7.26. It is possible to buy generic 
drugs in 14.16%. The average fee for express delivery was $17.25, with a range between $7 
and $26. More than half the online pharmacies in the sample (52.21%) maintain telephone 
assistance lines and 34.51% of them provide access to a pharmacist. Price lists were provided 
by almost all sites (95.58%), while only 6.19% offered price comparisons. VIPPS certification 
was held by 8.85%, with lower numbers for HON (5.31%) and VeriSign (7.83%).  
To explore the data in a more systematic way, a cluster analysis was performed using 
hierarchical agglomerative average linkage clustering. The resulting dendrogram (Figure 1) 
shows that pharmacies in the sample gather neatly into two groups, which are well separated 
by a large dissimilarity gap. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of these two groups. The 
fact that the high-quality group presents significantly ‘better’ means in all relevant dimensions 
strongly supports the typology hypothesis. 
3.2. Determinants of quality 
The regression models also confirm the hypotheses about the impact of insurance 
coverage and reputation on quality. In particular, results presented in Tables 5 and 6 show that 
the three independent variables explain a substantial share of the variability observed in the 
quality of service, the availability of information channels and the supply of third-party 
quality certification. Most strongly, all three dependent variables are positively related to 
insurance coverage. Without inferring the direction of causality (more on this below), those 
pharmacies with insurance coverage are much more likely to require a prescription, not to sell 
in foreign markets, sell other products in addition to drugs, sell a wider variety of drugs and 
charge less for urgent delivery. They also tend to provide more information. In particular, they 
tend to offer information on the use of drugs (‘Ask the pharmacist’). Moreover, they are more 
inclined to have their quality independently certified by a third party.  
                                                 
13 For these, a value of 100 was taken. The signs and statistical significance of the parameters 
and the model did not change when other assumptions (35, 1,000 and 10,000) were 
introduced.    14
Insurance coverage shows such an unusually high explanatory power that, as detailed in 
Table 5, one of the values of some of the dependent variables (PrescReq, PhoneLine, E-mail, 
AskPharm,  VIPPS,  HON) is fully determined by the InsurCov variable. In particular, all 
online pharmacies in which purchases can be charged to insurers require an independent 
prescription, provide an ‘Ask the Pharmacist’ information service and receive queries via e-
mail. Similarly, VIPPS and HON certificates are found only in pharmacies in which drugs can 
be charged to insurers.14 As a consequence, logit models for variables with such one-way 
causation are estimated by dropping the variables with zeroes and excluding the observations 
fully determined by the dropped variables, in order to avoid biasing the remaining 
coefficients. This affects models (2), (9), (10), (14) and (15) in Table 6, in which the absence 
of a coefficient, instead of indicating a lack of statistical significance, means quite the 
opposite: a certain relation between the corresponding dependent and independent variables.  
There is also a positive connection between most of these quality factors and the fact that 
firms also operate conventional pharmacies. What’s more, all online pharmacies running 
conventional operations also require prescriptions, as described in Table 5, causing another 
case of structural zeroes. They are also less likely to sell prescription drugs in foreign markets, 
and they stock more products and generics, and provide better information to users. As 
predicted, they are, however, less likely to be certified, probably because they use the 
reputation of their conventional operations to distinguish them effectively from rogue sites. 
Internet certificates seem to act as a substitute for extending pharmacies’ reputation from the 
conventional to the online segments of the market. (This effect on third-party certification, 
which is not statistically significant for the full sample, becomes significantly negative when 
considering the interactions with age, as shown in Table 7).  
Thirdly, the age of the online operations is strongly related to most of the dependent 
variables. Older online pharmacies are more likely to require a prescription, sell products 
other than medicines, carry a full line of medicines, sell generics and be certified. Specific 
                                                 
14 In this sample, it seems sensible to interpret the lack of observations with certain 
characteristics (zeroes in Table 5) as being ‘fixed zeroes’ (i.e., ‘structural’), which are 
impossible to observe, instead of as ‘random’ (‘sampling’) zeroes, which might have simply 
remained unobserved in the sample (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000, 135-140). The reason lies 
in the additional adverse selection and moral hazard that would arise when insuring medicine 
expenditures without requiring that prescriptions be provided by independent third parties.   15
analysis using interactive variables shows that the effect of age on quality of service is 
concentrated amongst pharmacies operating only online (Table 7). Similarly, third party 
certification is more likely for older sites without insurance coverage or conventional 
operations. This is consistent with the idea that pure online players increase their quality with 
time but conventional firms diversifying online or linked to insurers start their operations by 
providing a high-quality service.  
Coefficients in all models are not only statistically significant but also economically 
significant. For instance, insurance coverage and running conventional operations increase the 
quality index level in half and one third, respectively, of this index’s full range. The effect of 
pharmacies’ age is also substantial, with only five and nine years being necessary for age to 
produce a similar impact to that of insurance and running conventional operations, 
respectively.  
3.3. Endogeneity of quality determinants 
The previous section assumed that all the independent variables were exogenous. This 
allowed us to analyse service quality, information and certification attributes at the level of 
specific variables. The analysis, however, could be affected by the endogenous nature of two 
of the independent variablesinsurance coverage and certification. When pharmacies decide 
on their strategy and quality, they are likely to take into consideration both insurance coverage 
and insurers’ and certifiers’ requirements. However, insurers and certifiers also consider 
pharmacies’ quality when deciding if they are going to cover purchases by their insured 
parties in a specific pharmacy or grant them a quality certificate.  
To check for the possible effects of endogeneity, a system of structural equations was 
estimated using three-stage regression. The equations consider the three independent 
variables, the service quality index and the certification and information indices used in the 
previous econometric analysis. The equations are:  
QualIndex  =  β1 + β2 InsurCov + β3 RealAssets + β4 PharmAge + ε1 
Certifcs   =  β5 + β6 InsurCov + β7 RealAssets + β8 QualIndex + ε2 
InsurCov   =  β9 + β10  QualIndex + β11 Certifcs + β12 InfoIndex)+ ε3   16
The results, presented in Table 8, confirm the analysis in the previous sectionin 
particular, the positive effect of insurance coverage, running conventional operations and 
pharmacies’ age on service quality. Also, the propensity of pharmacies with insurance 
coverage and without conventional operations to submit themselves to third-party 
certification. Lastly, as expected from the endogeneity rationale, quality of service and 
information positively affect the likelihood of a pharmacy offering its customers 
reimbursement from its insurers.  
4. Policy discussion 
This article shows that the online pharmacy industry is split into two segments of poor and 
high quality, as a consequence of the simultaneous presence of rigorous licensing in some 
countries and ineffective enforcement everywhere. It also identifies the determinants of 
quality provision of services. In particular, it finds that quality is higher for pharmacies with 
insurance coverage, those which also operate conventional pharmacies and those which have 
been open for a longer time. 
These results suggest that provision of high-quality service in this industry is possible, can 
be regulated by public intervention and can be powered by market forces. Possibility has been 
demonstrated by the functioning of licensed online pharmacies. The efficacy of regulation has 
been indirectly shown by the significant impact that insurance coverage, a close proxy of 
public licensing, has on all measures of quality. Finally, the importance and compatibility of 
market forces is also clear, as quality is also driven by reputational investments linked to 
reputational spillovers (proxied through the simultaneous running of conventional operations) 
or accumulated over time through compliance with the promised levels of quality (proxied by 
pharmacies’ age). 
This interpretation supports the lifting of the current prohibitions of this activity in most 
European countries. Such liberalization would facilitate the benefits of electronic commerce 
in this area without causing any drop in service quality. On the contrary, the current activity 
of fraudulent sites would probably be hindered by the functioning of licensed online 
pharmacies, as the later would take part of the current demand of fraudulent sites.    17
Liberalization and licensing of online pharmacies are also compatible with the current 
systems of protective regulation, whatever their real merits are. The regulatory framework for 
online pharmacies would therefore be stricter than that for other online operations which are 
regulated by rules applying the electronic commerce Directive (00/31/EC). It could be similar 
to that for conventional pharmacies, including equivalent quality assurance, insurance 
coverage and corrective policies consisting of entry barriers and minimum standards of 
quality and service. If deemed necessary, it is also possible to incorporate online pharmacies 
into cross-subsidy schemes, thus reducing the impact on existing pharmacies.  
Finally, our empirical findings also suggest that normal market forces are working in this 
online market towards the development of conventional market-driven assurance 
mechanisms, based on the reputation of market participants and specialized third parties. It 
has been shown, first, that insurers demand quality of service. Secondly, firms diversifying 
into online operations start out by providing higher quality, probably to capitalize on their 
reputational assets. Thirdly, pure online operators and those without insurance coverage are 
more likely to use private third-party certification than those also running conventional 
pharmacies. Lastly, the quality of purely online operators tends to improve with age. These 
findings advise a prudently patient regulatory attitude, as markets need time to develop 
safeguarding institutions adapted to the possibilities of new technologies.15 Overall, and given 
also the difficulties to enforce prohibitions effectively, regulators should probably focus their 
activity on the setting of standards and the education of consumers. To some extent, this is 
what the US Federal Drug Administration has been doing with respect to e-pharmacies—in 
addition to investigating and prosecuting criminal activity, it has been busy in requiring 
quality certifications, intimidating rogue sites with ‘cyber’ letters and educating users in 
sound Internet purchasing practices.16  
Many issues remain open for further research, however. In particular, future studies would 
benefit from additional information on the strategies followed by new entrants and 
                                                 
15 Time is needed also for designing the services with the highest value, as shown by some 
surveys of online shoppers (Yang, Peterson and Huang, 2001), probably because of the 
substantial change implicit in e-commerce. It is hardly surprising, then, that developing 
effective safeguards also takes time.  
16 See details of these activities of the FDA in http://www.fda.gov/oc/buyonline/ (visited 
September 4, 2001).    18
pharmacies’ actual performance. For instance, information on advertising expenditures—an 
alternative source of reputational capital—would make it possible to examine in greater depth 
the comparative advantage that firms also running conventional pharmacies seem to enjoy 
over those that only operate online. Secondly, on the issue of performance, the article has 
relied on evidence from the services offered by online pharmacies to estimate the effects of 
quality assurance mechanisms. This evidence nicely complements studies that examine the 
quality of online pharmacies via a sample of real purchases, gathering data on the actual 
prices and quality provided. The integration of both approaches, however, would be a 
promising avenue for future research. By combining information on quality assurance and 
performance, such integration would make it possible to test whether quality assurance 
explains not only the quality offered but also actual quality. It would also allow the net 
benefits for consumers to be gauged with greater precision.    19
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Table 1. Definition and descriptive statistics of all variables 
Variable 
names  Explanation 
a  Obser-
vations  Mean  Standard 
deviation  Maximum Minimum 
  Independent variables:       
InsurCov  Insurers cover purchases of medicines in this 
pharmacy  
113 .1946903  .3977258  1  0 
RealAssets  Also runs conventional pharmacies   113  .1327434  .3408085  1  0 
PharmAge  Years since the pharmacy is opened (not a dummy 
variable 
b) 
113 1.141593  1.231051  7  0 
  Dependent variables:        
  Quality of service:  
     
QualIndex  Scores of principal components analysis of 
standardized PrescRqd, FrgnSales, OtherPrd, 
Products and Generics
 b 
104  0.000000 1.846403 -1.315452 4.014492 
PrescRqd  Requires the buyer to present a prescription, without 
relying fully on an internal questionnaire 
113 .300885  .4606857  1  0 
FrgnSales  Sells in foreign markets products requiring 
prescription 
104 .7019231  .4596285  1  0 
OtherPrd  Sells other products in addition to medicines  113  .1415929  .3501851  1  0 
Products  Number of products sold 
b  113 34.69912  45.03013 100  1 
Generics  Sells generic medicines 113  .1415929  .3501851  1  0 
UrgntFee  Additional cost of express or overnight delivery 
service (in US dollars) 
b 
65 17.24615  4.130794 26  7 
  Information to users: 
     
InfoIndex  Scores of principal components analysis of 
standardized PhoneLine, E-mail, AskPharm, 
PriceLis and PriceCom 
b 
113  0.000000 1.257515 -3.122688 3.548617 
PhoneLine  Offers a telephone line to help in problems related to 
purchases and deliveries 
113 .5221239  .5017353  1  0 
E-mail  Offers an E-mail address for buyers to contact about 
purchases and deliveries 
113 .9911504  .0940721  1  0 
AskPharm  Offers a service for buyers to consult about the use 
of medicines, doses, etc.  
113 .3451327  .4775292  1  0 
PriceLis  Presents lists of its prices  113  .9557522  .2065612  1  0 
PriceCom  Offers price comparisons with competitive 
pharmacies 
113 .0619469  .2421329  1  0 
  Third party quality certification:        
Certifcs  Sum of certifications (including VIPPS, HON, 
VeriSign and others; could take integer values zero 
to eight) 
b, c 
113 .2831858  .6610196  3  0 
VIPPS  Holds the VIPPS quality certification, created by the 
National Association of Boards of Pharmacy 
113 .0884956  .2852794  1  0 
HON  Follows the code of conduct of the foundation 
Health on the Net 
113 .0530973  .2252264  1  0 
VeriSign  Site registered as a VeriSign Secure Site Program  113  .079646  .2719504  1  0 
Notes: 
(a) All variables are dummies that take values one when true, zero otherwise, unless those marked 
(b). 
(c) In addition to VIPPS, 
HON and VeriSign, five other certifications are represented in the sample: NCPA, Hi-Ethics, TRUSTe, BBBOnLine and ePublicEye.   22
Table 2. Principal components analysis used to build the service quality index 
Component Eigenvalue Difference  Proportion Cumulative   
1  3.40920 2.66557 0.6818  0.6818   
2  0.74364 0.32318 0.1487  0.8306   
3  0.42046 0.07426 0.0841  0.9147   
4  0.34620 0.26570 0.0692  0.9839   
5 0.08050  .  0.0161  1.0000   
Eigenvectors       
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 
PrescRqd  0.51322 0.06843 -0.07530  0.37672 0.76442 
FrgnSale  -0.43557  0.31256 0.71138 0.43878 0.11829 
OtherPrd  0.40149  -0.56575 0.66609  -0.27334 -0.01859 
Products  0.49684 0.09502 0.00484 0.58785 -0.63130 
Generics  0.37262 0.75400 0.21111 -0.49525  -0.05280 
Scoring  Coefficients      
Variable  1      
PrescRqd  0.51322      
FrgnSale  -0.43557      
OtherPrd  0.40149      
Products  0.49684      
Generics  0.37262      







Table 3. Principal components analysis used to build the information index 
Component Eigenvalue Difference  Proportion Cumulative   
1  1.58134 0.53393 0.3163  0.3163   
2  1.04741 0.08005 0.2095  0.5258   
3  0.96736 0.13214 0.1935  0.7192   
4  0.83522 0.26654 0.1670  0.8863   
5 0.56867  .  0.1137  1.0000   
Eigenvectors       
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 
PhoneLine  0.62425 -0.07059  0.05812 0.35167 0.69157 
Email  0.18742 0.49982 0.81065 -0.23052  -0.06907 
AskPharm  0.59815 0.20443 -0.22856  0.32514 -0.66518 
PriceLis  -0.45076  0.16375 0.24090 0.84340 -0.02553 
PriceCom  -0.11924 0.82255  -0.47875 -0.07846 0.27172 
Scoring  Coefficients      
Variable  1      
PhoneLine  0.62425      
Email   0.18742      
AskPharm  0.59815      
PriceLis  -0.45076      
PriceCom  -0.11924      
Note: Score based on unrotated principal components, 4 scorings not used.   23
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Note: View limited to the top 20 branches.   24
Table 4. Characteristics and comparison of means of the two main clusters of online pharmacies 
Group of low quality pharmacies  Group of high quality pharmacies  Mean comparison 
Variable 
Number Mean  Std.  Dev.  Number Mean  Std. Dev.  t test  P > |t| 
InsurCov  77  0 0 36  .6111111  .4944132  -7.4152  .0000 
RealAssets  77  0 0 36  .4166667  .5  -5.000  .0000 
PharmAge  77  .8571429 .8226127 36  1.75  1.679711 -3.0243  .0042 
QualIndex  70  -1.171907  .3741161 34  2.412749 1.198849 -17.0367 .0000 
PrescRqd  77 .012987  .1139606  36 .9166667  .280306  -18.6367  .0000 
FrgnSales  70  .9  .3021661 34  .2941176 .4624973 6.9519  .0000 
OtherPrd  77  0 0 36  .4444444  .5039526  -5.2915  .0000 
Products  77  4.168831 4.894687 36  100  0  -171.8016  .0000 
Generics  77  0 0 36  .4444444  .5039526  -5.2915  .0000 
UrgntFee  44  18.70455 2.833188 21  14.19048 4.781412 4.0039  .0004 
InfoIndex  77  -.5123301  .8651883 36  1.095817 1.273691 -6.8706  .0000 
PhoneLine  77  .3766234 .4877165 36  .8333333 .3779645 -5.4365  .0000 
Email  77 .987013  .1139606  36 1  0  -1.0000  .3205 
AskPharm  77  .1428571 .3522217 36  .7777778 .421637  -7.8454  .0000 
PriceCom  77  .0649351 .2480271 36  .0555556 .2323107 0.1957  .8454 
PriceLis  77  .987013  .1139606 36  .8888889 .3187276 1.7943  .0804 
Certifcs  77  .025974  .1601008 36  .8333333 .9411239 -5.1127  .0000 
VIPPS  77  0 0 36  .2777778  .4542568  -3.6690  .0008 
HON  77  0 0 36  .1666667  .3779645  -2.6458  .0121 
VeriSign  77 .012987  .1139606  36 .2222222  .421637  -2.9279  .0058 
Note: Means are compared assuming unequal variances and using Welch formula (1947).    25
Table 5. Dependent variables which are fully determined by some independent variables (‘structural zeroes’)  
Dependent variables  Independent dummy variables 
InsurCov =  RealAssets = 
Variable name  Observations  Values 
= 0  = 1  = 0  = 1 
PrescReq   113  0 79 0 79 0 
   1  12  22
* 19 15
* 
PhoneLine  113  0 54 0 52 2 
   1  37  22
* 46 13 
E-mail  113  0 1 0 1 0 
   1  90  22
* 97 15
* 
AskPharm  113  0 74 0 72 2 
   1  17  22
* 26 13 
VIPPS  113 0 91
* 12 90 13 
   1  0  10  8  2 
HON  113 0 91
* 16 93 14 
    1 0 6 5 1 
Observations  113    91 22 98 15 
Note: 
(*) According to the sample, the value of the independent variable fully determines the dependent variable.   26
Table 6. Determinants of quality attributes of online pharmacies 
  Dependent variables: 




Quality dimensions included in online pharmacies’ 














  QualIndex PrescRqd FrgnSales OtherPrd Products Generics UrgntFee InfoIndex PhoneLine AskPharm PriceCom PriceLis Certifcs VIPPS HON  VeriSign 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
                          
Independent 
variables: 
                        
   
          
      















  (0.263)   (1.110)  (2.298)  (7.324)  (0.685)  (1.199)  (0.249)     (1.301)  (1.350)  (0.861)      (0.906) 
                                




*** 0.842  44.477
*** 2.170
*** 1.430  0.838
*** 1.070  2.336
** 0.320  -2.016
* -1.196  -1.715
* -1.567  0.182 
  (0.294)   (0.963) (0.977)  (8.313)  (0.701)  (2.032)  (0.249)  (0.907) (0.932) (1.251) (1.120)  (0.845) (1.004)  (1.223)  (0.889) 





*** 0.311  0.334  0.052  0.192  0.230 -0.718  1.160  0.383
* 0.015  0.075  0.387 
 (0.078)  (0.333)  (0.233)  (0.488)  (2.180)  (0.208) (0.357) (0.074)  (0.190)  (0.216)  (0.574) (0.905)  (0.229)  (0.367)  (0.366)  (0.269) 













***   0.440  -0.621  -4.331
*** 
 (0.132)  (0.707)  (0.490)  (2.826)  (3.638)  (0.520)  (0.653)  (0.124) (0.291)  (0.390)  (0.522)  (0.828)    (0.927)  (0.939)  (0.882) 
                                
Observations 104 85  104 113  113  113  65  113  91  91  113 113  113 22  22  113 
                          
R
2 0.74      0.64    0.22  0.46             
Pseudo R
2   0.15  0.50  0.71    0.22     0.02  0.10  0.05  0.24  0.42 0.11  0.09  0.29 
Notes: 
(a) Logit regressions except OLS in models (1), (5), (7) and (8) and ordered logit (13). 
(b) The variables InsurCov and RealAssets are dropped due to estimability caused by 
structural zeroes. As a consequence, only the 85 observations with InsurCov = 0 and RealAssets = 0 are considered. 
(c) The variable InsurCov dropped due to estimability—only the 91 
observations with InsurCov = 0 are considered. 
(d) The variable InsurCov dropped due to estimability—only the 22 observations with InsurCov = 1 are considered. 
(e) Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
(f) 
***, **, * = Statistically significant at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence level. 
***** = Structural zeroes.   27
Table 7. Basic attributes of services provided by online pharmacies 
(estimation using interactive age variables) 
  Dependent variables 
  Service quality  Information provided  Third party certification 
  QualIndex QualIndex  InfoIndex  InfoIndex Certifcs  Certifcs  Certifcs 
  (1) (2) (6) (7) (3) (4) (5) 
         
Independent 
variables: 
       









  (0.423) (0.261) (0.398) (0.242) (1.565) (1.560) (1.523) 





*** 0.082  -2.080
**  
  (0.431) (0.429) (0.415) (0.282) (2.032) (0.933)  
         
PharmAge  0.381
*** 0.374




  (0.096) (0.084) (0.091)   (0.300) (0.289) (0.299) 
         




*PharmAge  (0.191)   (0.184)   (0.471) (0.468) (0.458) 
         
RealAssets  -0.407
* -0.402
*  -0.327   -1.398   -1.353
** 
*PharmAge  (0.214) (0.210) (0.209)   (1.259)   (0.587) 





***     
  (0.142) (0.135) (0.133) (0.100)      
         
Observations  104 104 113 113 113 113 113 
         
R
2  0.75 0.75 0.48 0.46      
Pseudo R
2      0.49  0.48  0.49 
Notes: OLS regressions except ordered logit in models (3) to (5). Standard errors in parentheses.  
***, **, * = Statistically significant at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence level.   28
Table 8. Comparison between reduced-form models and structural equations 
  Individual OLS estimations 
  Dependent variables: 
System of simultaneous equations 
 (three-stage estimation) 
  QualIndex Certifcs InsurCov  QualIndex Certifcs InsurCov 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
           
InsurCov  2.798
*** 0.827
***   3.331
*** 1.076
*  
  (0.263)  (0.166)   (0.502)  (0.570)  
           
RealAssets  1.782
*** -0.596
***   1.563
*** -0.530
**  
  (0.294)  (0.147)   (0.343)  (0.231)  
           
PharmAge  0.311
***     0.272
***    
  (0.078)     (0.084)    
           
QualIndex   0.160
*** 0.089
***   0.104  0.076
*** 
    (0.040) (0.017)    (0.133) (0.028) 
           
Certifcs     0.222
***     0.121 
     (0.043)     (0.185) 
           
InfoIndex     0.063
***     0.099
** 
     (0.022)     (0.050) 





*** 0.134  0.162
*** 
  (0.132)  (0.057) (0.024)  (0.134)  (0.137) (0.055) 
           
Observations  104  104 104  104  104 104 
           
“R
2”  0.74  0.62 0.72  0.73  0.61 0.69 
Notes: Table entries in columns (1) to (3) report OLS coefficients for column variables regressed onto row variables. 
Entries in columns (4) to (6) report coefficients of a system of simultaneous structural equations estimated thorough 
three-stage regression. Standard errors in parentheses. 
***,**,* = Statistically significant at the 99%, 95% and 90% 
confidence level. 
 